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WAGON-CIRCLING PROHIBITED:
FORSAKING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS A MEANS TO
PROSECUTE BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the early settlement of the Dakota Territory and other parts of
the western United States, groups of settlers joined together to form wagon
trains to provide for mutual defense and navigation.1 When attacked along
the trail, a common defense strategy was to “circle up the wagons” to create
a protective perimeter to shield the travelers and defend the attack.2 Since
the first confrontations between prosecutors and alleged criminal organizations, lawyers and their corporate clients have employed a similar strategy
to establish defensive perimeters.3 In the wake of Enron and other wellpublicized corporate corruption scandals, federal prosecutors have been
empowered by new anti-corruption legislation and public outcry to develop
strategies to counter wagon-circling tactics in corporate boardrooms.4
Today, one of the most effective weapons for federal prosecutors in combating corporate corruption is the corporate charging guidelines issued by
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).5 This note examines the
effects of this prosecutorial zeal on fundamental constitutional rights of employees of target corporations.
United States Attorney James B. Comey diplomatically commented
that the Thompson Memorandum (Thompson Memo) has “[p]rovided a
balanced framework for DOJ attorneys to make difficult decisions.”6
1. SARA E. QUAY, WESTERN EXPANSION 216 (Ray B. Brown ed., Greenwood Press 2002).
2. Id.
3. See generally William R. McLucas et al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in
the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 637 (2006) (explaining that joint
defense agreements permitted corporations and employees to participate in internal investigations
without the risk of disclosure by the other party).
4. See Andrew J. Ceresney et al., The Attorney-Client Privilege and Internal Investigations:
Privilege Issues in Structuring an Investigation and Interviewing Witnesses, 163 PLI/N.Y. 207,
219 (Dec. 2006) (noting that joint defense agreements between corporations and employees are
disfavored under the DOJ’s corporate charging guidelines).
5. See generally Carmen Couden, Note, The Thompson Memorandum: A Revised Solution or
Just a Problem?, 30 J. CORP. L. 405, 415-21 (2005) (describing the DOJ’s various corporate
charging guidelines).
6. Interview by U.S. Attorney’s Office with United States Attorney James B. Comey
Regarding DOJ’s Policy on Requesting Companies under Criminal Investigation to Waive the
Attorney Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, 51 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 1, 5 (Nov. 2003),
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However, few other legal commentators and practitioners share the same
perspective.7 Most practitioners question Comey’s view of a balanced
framework in this new environment, which induces companies to turn
against their own employees in order to earn cooperation credits from the
government and avoid wider criminal indictments.8 Many practitioners also
wonder about the broader effects of the federal prosecutorial guidelines
framework, which in practice advocate weakening basic constitutional
safeguards that have been entrenched in our criminal system since its
origin.9 The defense bar and other commentators have offered vigorous
critical response to the government’s framework of prosecutorial methods.10
They argue that the DOJ’s instructions to the federal prosecutors often lead
to overzealous practice in combating corporate misconduct.11 Although the
DOJ has recently responded to the myriad of criticism against its principles
of federal prosecution of business organizations,12 ambiguities and concerns
still remain.13
This note intends to provide insight to the federal prosecutorial practices in the context of corporate investigations and the constitutional implications they carry for officers and employees of target entities. It is not a
comprehensive analysis of the new guidelines; rather, the note focuses on
the provisions that guide prosecutors in decisions about whether to indict a
company. Part II of this note traces the origin of the current prosecutorial
principles and guidelines, and provides the general basis for the myriad
criticisms. Part III provides a catalogue of the constitutional safeguards,
which may be affected by these prosecutorial principles. Additionally, this

available at http://usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab.5106.pdf [hereinafter Comey
Interview].
7. See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO ABA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES ON EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 3 (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
attorneyclient/materials/hod/emprights_report_adopted.pdf (opposing the government’s policies
and practices under the Thompson Memo) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Adam Weiskittel & Brian Collins, Corporate Fraud, 69 TEX. B.J. 26, 26 (2006)
(noting the increased concerns among the defense bar and commentators regarding the erosion of
the attorney-client privilege in internal investigations); see also John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming
Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 351 (2004)
(arguing that prosecutors often proceed in their charging decisions without significant public
scrutiny of the charges).
11. Weiskittel & Collins, supra note 10, at 26.
12. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads
of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf
[hereinafter McNulty Memo].
13. See infra Part II.C. (discussing the potential consequences of the new federal
prosecutorial guidelines).
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part describes the first court decision declaring certain components of these
principles unconstitutional. Part IV considers the public policy concerns
connected with this set of prosecutorial principles. In conclusion, part V
offers a solution to these concerns.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN
CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS
As early as 1909, the United States Supreme Court in New York
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States,14 developed the
legal theory that a business entity could be held accountable for the actions
of agents and/or employees.15 The United States Supreme Court held that
companies could be found criminally liable for any act committed by an
employee in the course of such person’s employment if the act was
intended to benefit the company.16 More than eighty years later, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the principle that a company may be
“criminally liable for the unlawful acts of its agents, provided that the
conduct is within the scope of the agent’s authority, whether actual or
apparent.”17 Despite these early cases and statutes,18 it was a novel development in June 1999 when the DOJ adopted a consistent approach to
corporate prosecution.19 Since then, the DOJ has continuously refined its
approach.20 To better understand the current criticisms of the DOJ’s practices in corporate investigations, it is useful to examine the original
administrative policy, which began with the Holder Memo in 1999, and
follow the revisions leading to the current formula.21

14. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
15. New York Cent., 212 U.S. at 481.
16. Id. at 495.
17. United States v. Inv. Enter., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1993).
18. See Mark Robeck et al., Corporate Cooperation in the Face of Government
Investigations, 17 HEALTH LAW. 20, 21-22 (2005) (citing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2003) (RICO), Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd, 78ff(c) (1977) (FCPA) and Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 56
Fed. Reg. 22762-01 (1991) (SGOs)).
19. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron
World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2006).
20. Id. at 1100.
21. See generally Baker, supra note 10, at 326-36 (addressing the criticism of the DOJ’s
corporate charging guidelines and tracing the guidelines’ development throughout the years).
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A. THE HOLDER MEMO
In 1999, federal prosecutors were confronted with a rising tide of
corporate criminal misconduct committed either by companies or on behalf
of companies.22 To address this emerging concern, former Deputy Attorney
General Eric H. Holder issued what has come to be known as the “Holder
Memo.”23 This internal policy memorandum, officially entitled “Federal
Prosecution of Companies,” contained prosecutorial guidelines to determine
whether a corporate organization should be criminally charged, instead of,
or in addition to, suspected culpable employees.24 It listed several factors
for federal prosecutors to consider when deciding “whether to charge a
corporation in a particular case.”25 To determine whether a corporate criminal action should be taken, federal prosecutors were instructed to consider
eight specific factors in addition to the factors considered in an individual
criminal charge.26 The new corporate factors were:
(1) The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of
harm to the public . . .
(2) The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,
including the complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by
corporate management . . .
(3) The corporation’s history of similar conduct, including prior
criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it . . .
(4) The corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of
its agents including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate
attorney-client and work product privileges . . .
(5) The existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance
program . . .
(6) The corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to
implement an effective corporate compliance program or to
improve an existing one, to replace responsible management, to
discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to
cooperate with the relevant government agencies . . .

22. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All
Component Heads & U.S. Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations, preface
(June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/append/ix/appendixk.pdf
[hereinafter Holder Memo].
23. Id.; Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1099.
24. Holder Memo, supra note 22, at preface.
25. Id.
26. Robeck et al., supra note 18, at 22.
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(7) Collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to
shareholders and employees not proven personally culpable . . .
and
(8) The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or
regulatory enforcement actions . . . .27
These factors constituted the DOJ’s first attempt to create a uniform
approach in corporate investigations.28 The Holder Memo’s overall purpose was to provide guidance only to federal prosecutors in an emerging
environment of corporate corruption.29 The Holder Memo was also
symbolic of the DOJ’s firming commitment to prosecute business organizations, calling for a vigorous enforcement of criminal laws against wrongdoers.30 Accordingly, the Holder Memo marked a critical shift in the
government’s attitude toward corporate investigations.31 Despite these
intentions, the record does not indicate a rise in the number of prosecutions
of business organizations after the Holder Memo was issued.32 However,
four years after the Holder Memo was first issued, a new set of guidelines
contained in the Thompson Memo affirmed and sharpened the DOJ’s
commitment.33
B. THE THOMPSON MEMO
If the Holder Memo marked the beginning of a new era with respect to
corporate prosecutions, the 2003 DOJ’s “Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations,” confirmed the direction.34 The Thompson
Memo reiterated the DOJ’s firm commitment to combat corporate fraud
through the prosecution of individuals for corporate malfeasance and/or the

27. Holder Memo, supra note 22, at Part II.A.
28. Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1109.
29. Id. The eight enumerated factors were not meant to be outcome-determinative. Id.
Instead, under the Holder Memo, they were intended as an analysis framework for prosecutors,
and prosecutors were given great latitude in their consideration of these factors. Id.
30. Holder Memo, supra note 22, at Part I.A.
31. Robeck et al., supra note 18, at 23.
32. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1188 n.19 (reporting a decrease in criminal
prosecutions of business organizations from 255 in fiscal year 1999, to 238 in fiscal year 2001).
33. Id. at 1101.
34. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations, preface (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_
guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo] (“The main focus of the revisions is increased
emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation.”); see also Wray &
Hur, supra note 19, at 1100-01 (noticing the introduction of several major revisions, particularly
the emphasis on authentic corporate cooperation with government investigations).
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company itself.35 Moreover, the Thompson Memo not only restated the
Holder Memo’s prosecutorial principles, but changed them from
discretionary to mandatory.36
The Thompson Memo stated that its adoption was the result of a review
of the utility of the Holder Memo prompted by several matters related to
corporate misconduct, including those confronted by the President’s
Corporate Fraud Task Force.37 It reinforced the DOJ’s ultimate goal of
“[r]ooting out criminal corporate conduct” and did so partly by offering
incentives for companies to report criminal conduct voluntarily.38
In addition to the eight factors enumerated in the Holder Memo, the
Thompson Memo introduced one new factor and amended the seventh
factor.39 Under the amended seventh factor, a prosecutor must now weigh
any disproportionate harm to innocent third parties and the public resulting
from criminal charges against a company.40 In Part II.A(8), the Memo
included a new factor, which took into account “the adequacy of the
prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance.” 41
The new factors evinced a shift in the policies set forth in the Holder
Memo.42 The Thompson Memo stated that the “imposition of individual
criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future
corporate wrongdoing [and] [o]nly rarely should provable individual
culpability not be pursued.”43 This reasoning reversed the historical

35. Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1106-07 (noting that the Thompson Memo’s emphasis on
prosecuting individuals for corporate misconduct and, where necessary, the company itself
regardless of the extent of its cooperation with government investigations, was egregious).
36. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Thompson Memo,
supra note 34, at Part III.A; see also Couden, supra note 5, at 415 (considering the DOJ’s mixed
messages to companies as to whether the provisions set forth in the Thompson Memo should in
reality be considered as rules rather than discretionary guidelines, and opting for the former).
37. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at preface. The President’s Corporate Fraud Task
Force was created by President George W. Bush in 2002 after several high-profile corporate
scandals, such as Adelphia Communications, WorldCom, and HealthSouth companies. Wray &
Hur, supra note 19, at 1101. Between March and June of 2002, WorldCom and Adelphia
Communications disclosed severe corporate fraud incidents, and in March of 2003, HealthSouth, a
large operator of rehabilitation hospitals and surgery centers disclosed a massive accounting fraud.
Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 225-28 (2004).
38. Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1098.
39. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part II.A.(7)-(8).
40. Id. at Part II.A.(7).
41. Id. at Part II.A.(8).
42. Theodore V. Wells, Jr. et al., Current Developments in the Government’s Corporate
Prosecution Policy, 1517 PLI/Corp 829, 833 (Nov. 2005); see also Couden, supra note 5, at 414
(suggesting that charging culpable individuals rather than the company might prove more
effective).
43. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part I.B.
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practice in prosecuting corporate crime from initially targeting the company
to initially targeting individuals.44
More significantly, the Thompson Memo, unlike its predecessor,
placed the focus of the prosecutors’ charging decision on the effectiveness
and authenticity of the company’s cooperation with the federal prosecutors.45 This was directly indicated in the commentary to the section
“Cooperation and Voluntary Disclosure.”46 Specifically, the Thompson
Memo instructed the DOJ to closely scrutinize the degree of cooperation by
the company to ensure that the company indeed does all it can to provide
the prosecutors with necessary information, and does not “[m]erely pay[]
lip service to cooperation.”47
Like the Holder Memo, in theory, no factor was intended to be given a
greater weight than the others.48 Rather, prosecutors were required to
consider all nine factors contemporaneously.49 However, in practice, the
degree of cooperation may have been assigned a heavier weight than other
factors given the Thompson Memo’s emphasis on cooperation.50 Nevertheless, if the other factors outweighed the cooperation, prosecution of the
business entity may have been warranted.51
In practice, the Thompson Memo has received mixed reviews.52 An
evaluation of the general impact of the Thompson Memo is necessary to
weigh its utility, including the most important criticisms. Much of this
criticism is directed at specific provisions of the Thompson Memo, most
notably the expectation of corporations’ waiver of attorney-client and work
product privilege, and denial of advancement of legal fees and expenses to
44. McLucas et al., supra note 3, at 633.
45. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at preface (stressing “increased emphasis on and
scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation”).
46. Id. at Part VI.B. The Memo provides:
Another factor to be weighed . . . is whether the corporation, while purporting to
cooperate, has engaged in conduct that impedes the investigation (whether or not
rising to the level of criminal obstruction). Examples of such conduct include: overly
broad assertions of corporate representation of employees or former employees; inappropriate directions to employees or their counsel, such as directions not to cooperate
openly and fully with the investigation including, for example, the direction to decline
to be interviewed; making presentations or submissions that contain misleading
assertions or omissions; incomplete or delayed production of records; and failure to
promptly disclose illegal conduct known to the corporation.
Id.
47. Wells et al., supra note 42, at 833.
48. Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1136.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1145-46.
51. Id.
52. See generally id., at 1170-85 (defending the Thompson Memo and presenting the main
criticism to it).
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corporate officers and employees under investigation for corporate
misconduct.53
1.

General Impact of the Thompson Memo

The amendments and additions to the Thompson Memo have certainly
strengthened the prosecutor’s hand, but not without questionable consequences.54 On one hand, the companies’ waivers of their attorney-client
privilege and/or work product protection count among the most controversial effects because such waivers deprive companies of confidential
communications.55 On the other hand, the Thompson Memo itself explains
the benefits of indicting companies for malfeasance, including “enabl[ing]
the government to address and be a force for positive change of corporate
culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent, discover, and punish white
collar crime.”56 The most notable positive effects of the Thompson Memo
include: companies are more sensitive to their responsibilities towards
shareholders; more effective corporate compliance programs; less time is
invested in criminal investigations, which permits companies to quickly refocus on their primary business activities; increased public confidence in
corporate governance; and greater stability in the stock market.57
Several corporate cooperation examples have confirmed that companies have received the message of “cooperate and we will not indict you,”
as seen in the Royal Dutch Shell and the Homestore, Inc. investigations—
Homestore, Inc. was under investigation for accounting fraud, but the prosecutors were very impressed with the level of cooperation by the new management so they declined to charge the company.58 According to former
Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ Criminal Division, Christopher A.
Wray, “in most cases, cooperation is an extremely important factor, and

53. Id. at 1172, 1181-82.
54. Id. at 1098.
55. See Couden, supra note 5, at 418-20 (pointing out that disclosure under the Thompson
Memo also exposes companies to a “host of liability concerns”).
56. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part I.A.
57. McLucas, et al., supra note 3, at 622; Kenneth M. Breen et al., The Future of Corporate
“Cooperation” Under the Thompson Memorandum – Will There be a Shift Toward Greater
Predictability? (Oct. 2005), http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail
&pub_id=2-2026&site_id=494&detail=yes (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
58. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1135-36 (noting that extensive cooperation may result
in a decline of charges and penalties); see also Andrew J. Levander, Recent Development in
Securities Cases and Investigations, 1505 PLI/Corp 969, 983-85 (Sept. 2005) (discussing the
Homestore, Inc. and Royal Dutch Shell investigations). Royal Dutch Shell was under investigation for overstating its oil and gas reserves for 2002 and prior years, but was spared indictment
given the extent of its cooperation. Id.
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getting credit for that cooperation can make a huge difference in our
[federal prosecutors’] charging decision.”59
However, the emphasis on corporate cooperation in federal criminal
investigations has drawn significant criticism of the wider prosecutorial
discretion created by the Thompson Memo.60 One subtle outcome has been
that federal prosecutors across the country have interpreted the guidelines to
the effect that they apply differently depending on the business sector being
targeted.61 Other criticisms have more ominous implications, such as the
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection, and the
detrimental effect of the prosecutorial practices on the companies’
relationships with their employees.62
2. Criticism of the Thompson Memo Focusing on the CompanyEmployee Relationship
The Thompson Memo has been the subject of a great deal of criticism
from the white-collar criminal defense bar.63 In particular, the defense bar
has alleged that the change in prosecutorial attitude under this Memo has
effectively eroded the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine defenses.64 Recent criticisms also focused on the downstream effect
of the pressure exercised by prosecutors on companies under investigation
and the resulting myriad of implications for individual employees.65
According to the guidelines laid out in the Thompson Memo,
[a]nother factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the
corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees and
agents. . . . [A] corporation’s promise of support to culpable

59. Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the 22nd Annual Corporate
Counsel Institute 5 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/press_room/
speeches/2003_2986_rmrk121203Corprtconslinst.pdf.
60. See Robeck et al., supra note 18, at 24 (noting the criticism regarding the DOJ’s policies’
effect on the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege routinely demanding waivers).
61. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1102, 1153-63 (noting additional trends in the
enforcement of the Thompson Memorandum principles in the areas of antitrust crimes,
environmental crimes, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
62. Robeck et al., supra note 18, at 20.
63. Id. at 24.
64. See Sarah Helene Duggin, The Impact of the War Over the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege on the Business of American Health Care, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 301,
317-18 (2006) (pointing out common concerns among members of the defense bar).
65. See, e.g., Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the
Crooks: The Impact of Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1225, 1232-33 (2006) (explaining that companies in their quest for cooperation credit with
the government may use threats of termination or decline to provide counsel to employees, and/or
fail to advise employees that the content of their interviews in internal investigations will be
disclosed to the government).
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employees and agents, either through the advancing of attorneys
fees, through retaining the employees without sanction for their
misconduct, or through providing information to the employees
about the government’s investigation . . . may be considered by the
prosecutor in weighing the extent and value of a corporation’s
cooperation.66
As this passage illustrates, the Thompson Memo paid small regard to
loyalty between employer and employee, regardless of expectations of legal
defense support.
It has been argued that the government’s requirement that cooperation
be “authentic,” in effect forced companies to place employees in a situation
where their constitutional rights are endangered, or worse, violated without
recourse.67 Within this context, the prosecutorial discretion may seem to be
“an abuse of the charging power.”68 However, some commentators have
argued that government-created incentives for corporate cooperation with
federal investigators facilitate and accelerate the investigations.69 Further,
in a hearing before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, a
United States Attorney testified that it is “good practice” to ask a company
to cooperate with and assist the federal prosecutors in their investigations,
since it saves resources and may bring a quick end to the investigation.70
Nevertheless, where the requests for cooperation have created a “culture of
cooperation” at the expense of fundamental rights of employees, the question becomes whether the DOJ has struck the constitutionally appropriate
balance.71 The tension created between the companies’ interest to avoid
criminal charges, and the vulnerability of their employees who find

66. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part VI.B. (footnote omitted).
67. See Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1233 (noting that employees may be deprived of
their right to assert the Fifth Amendment right when they are not informed of the company’s
intent to disclose all information gathered during an internal investigation to the government).
68. Couden, supra note 5, at 421.
69. See, e.g., Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1170-71 (explaining that given limited government resources, the government benefits from offering companies incentives for their cooperation,
and such offers also promote a “real-time enforcement,” which leads to an increase in both
numbers and pace of investigations).
70. The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., S. Hrg. 109-835,
Serial No. J-109-108, 2, 3 (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Thompson Memo Hearing] (statement of
Deputy Att’y Gen., DOJ, Paul J. McNulty).
71. Marvin G. Pickholz & Jason R. Pickholz, Investigations Put Employees in Tough Spot:
Are ‘Cooperating’ Companies Violating Constitutional Rights?, 236 N.Y.L.J. 2, 2 (July 24, 2006),
available at http://www.akerman.com/documents/Pickholz%20White20Collar%20NYLJ%20724-06.pdf.
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themselves “sold” to the government, is a valid concern.72 Companies may
overly expose their employees and provide the government with an
increased share of employees’ inculpatory statements or false exculpatory
statements made during internal investigations.73
Recently, these criticisms have received judicial support in United
States v. Stein,74 where certain aspects of the Thompson Memo were ruled
unconstitutional.75 Among the most pressing concerns voiced by critics is
the focus on the assisting-role played by capitulating companies in the
realm of government investigations.76 In practice, this approach has led to
extreme criticisms of the prosecutorial practices for allowing, and sometimes even requesting companies to do the government’s job by conducting
internal investigations and disclosing their findings to the federal prosecutors.77 Therefore, these guidelines have appeared to give a pass to federal
prosecutors to obtain information through certain questionable economies,
such as the companies’ internal investigations and identification of culpable
individuals.78 This has facilitated the prosecutors’ work because they could
gain access to evidence without dependence on traditional means, such as
grand jury subpoenas and conferral of immunity.79 Proponents of the
Thompson Memo have argued that companies are not coerced into waiving

72. See Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals
of 2002-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer’s Clash with Donaldson Over Turf, the Choice of
Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
443, 477 (2003-04) (noting that companies are penalized for assisting employees or senior
executives under investigation).
73. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1181 (enumerating criticism of the Thompson Memo
with regard to the strain it causes on relationships between companies and employees).
74. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
75. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356 (finding the Thompson Memo unconstitutional to the extent
that the government pressured and coerced KPMG to withhold advancement of legal fees and
defense costs for employees on the threat of refusing to grant them “cooperator” status). For a
more thorough examination, see infra Part IV.C. (discussing the parties’ arguments and the Stein
holding).
76. See Oesterle, supra note 72, at 477 (noting that for a company to gain cooperation credit
it must do the government’s job in finding the culpable individuals and turning them in); see also
Comey Interview, supra note 6, at 2 (“For a corporation to get credit for cooperation, it must help
the Government catch the crooks.”).
77. John Gibeaut, Junior G-Men: Corporate Lawyers Worry that They’re Doing the
Government’s Bidding While Doing Internal Investigations, 89 A.B.A.J., 46, 46 (June 2003); see
also N. Richard Janis, Taking the Stand: Deputizing Company Counsel as Agents of the Federal
Government: How Our Adversary System of Justice is Being Destroyed (Mar. 2005), available at
http://dcbar.org/for_lawyers/washington_lawyer/march_2005/stand.cfm (criticizing the government’s emphasis on cooperation, alleging that prosecutors are given extraordinary powers over
companies under investigation).
78. David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death
of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 156-57 (2000).
79. Id. at 148, 156.
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privileges and turning in culpable employees.80 However, as evidenced by
the collapse, in 2002, of Arthur Andersen LLP, one of the world’s oldest
and largest accounting firms, a criminal indictment instead of cooperation
with the government can lead to a corporate death penalty.81 Therefore, in
similar cases, it is naïve to pretend that companies are free to choose
between cooperation and indictment.82 Often, the potential consequences of
indictment and bankruptcy determine the choice.83 The company surrenders under the government’s powers, “and consequently, strip[s] [the] process of its adversarial nature.”84 In succumbing to the role of investigative
agents for the government, companies may be creating equally threatening
problems, including jeopardizing their relationship with their employees.85
The fiduciary employer-employee relationship would certainly be
endangered if employees understood that their company’s internal investigation was actually an effort to secure cooperation credit from the government at their expense.86 In such a scenario, if trust were absent, both the
accuracy of any information provided to the investigators, as well as future
critical business information exchanges necessary for effective corporate
decision-making would be questionable.87
Moreover, companies who seek to obtain information that will later be
turned over to the government, in an effort to portray authentic cooperation,
fail to advise employees that the content of their interviews for the purposes
of internal investigations will be disclosed to the government.88 They also
tend to fail to provide counsel to employees subjected to such interviews. 89
It is therefore questionable whether such methods conform to constitutional

80. See Mary Beth Buchannan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the
Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 610 (2004) (arguing that the waiver
of privileges is voluntary and the arguments that the Thompson Memo principles erode the
attorney-client privilege are overstated).
81. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1229.
82. See id. (noting that today’s companies’ choice between “life and death” often means
acting as government’s agents in its investigations).
83. See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1641, 1648 (2006) (noting the negative impact of criminal indictments on a corporation’s
reputation to the point at which the corporation declares bankruptcy).
84. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1229.
85. Id. at 1230.
86. Ellen S. Podgor, White-Collar Cooperators: The Government in the Employer-Employee
Relationship, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 795, 803 (2002).
87. See, e.g., Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The Conceptual
Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1092
(2006) (pointing out reports from companies and corporate lawyers that corporate employees no
longer are willing to communicate with corporate lawyers because they lack a reasonable
assurance of confidentiality).
88. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1232.
89. Id.
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provisions.90 According to the DOJ, these are not real concerns because
only guilty employees would choose to refrain from being interviewed,
while “[e]mployees who have only made mistakes will understand.” 91
Nevertheless, the slippery slope is apparent, especially since the employees
may not know that the government is involved, or may lack knowledge as
to the exact area of the government’s interest.92 Under such premises,
“innocent” employees could also face the risk of adverse employment
action, as well as indictment for obstruction of justice, even if no federal
agent was present during the employees’ interviews.93 By effectively
“deputizing” companies to act on behalf of the government, the company is
said to act under “color of law” during interviews with its employees. 94
This interpretation follows from several developments within the context of
white-collar crime investigations.95 The Thompson Memo contained language implicitly stating that prosecutors, when assessing a company’s
complete cooperation with the investigators, must take into account a
company’s willingness to take certain punitive actions against employees
and other agents during the time of the investigation.96 The net result has

90. See generally id. at 1225-26 (noting employees’ constitutional rights may be disregarded
in attempts by corporations to avoid criminal indictments).
91. Comey Interview, supra note 6, at 3.
92. Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 71, at 2. One of the criteria used by some federal
prosecutors in determining whether there is “authentic” cooperation is whether the company kept
the subject of the government’s interest from the employees during their interviews. Id.
93. Id.; see also Daniel Bookin et al., Obstruction of Justice Under Computer Associates:
Legal, Tactical and Ethical Implications for Attorneys Conducting Internal Investigations, 1564
PLI/Corp 259, 263-64 n 3, 273 (Aug. 2006) (citing United States v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc.,
Cr. No. 04-837 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) and United States v. Singleton, CR-06-080, CR-04-514 (S.D.
Tex. 2006)). These cases support the position that corporate counsel conducting internal
investigations are “deputized” federal agents. Id. In both cases false, misleading statements and
omissions to corporate counsel were criminalized under a statute that prohibits obstructing the
work of federal agents. Id.
94. See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 78, at 147 (referring to the “deputizing of ‘Corporate
America’” though the shift in prosecutorial attitude, nowadays demanding full disclosure of all
relevant evidence to the investigation of corporate malfeasance); see also Pickholz & Pickholz,
supra note 71, at 2 (arguing that companies who conduct internal investigations with the intent to
surrender any findings to the government act under “color of law” during employees’ interviews).
95. See Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 71, at 2-3 (listing developments occurring in
corporate prosecutions over the past five to eight years). Such developments include: (a) the
Holder and Thompson Memoranda and the requirement of “authentic” cooperation; (b) the
coercive threat of prosecution coupled with the overt or implied promise of leniency in exchange
of complete cooperation; (c) the company’s understanding of these practical realities at the outset
of the internal investigation and that the company will in fact be turning over its internal employee
interview notes to the prosecutors; (d) the Hobson’s choice facing employees of giving an
interview to their employer of being terminated; and (e) the potential for the employee to be
criminally indicted for obstruction of justice or impeding a government investigation. Id.
96. See Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part VI.B. (stating that the Thompson Memo
encourages prosecutors to deny cooperation credit to business organizations that assist or support
“culpable employees and agents”).
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become a demand for waiver of the employees’ Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination as a condition of continued employment.97 Additionally, it was argued that it resulted in a waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, and the ability to be free from government interference in
obtaining and using lawful resources in the preparation of a defense.98 In
2006, the government responded with a slight revision to its practices.
C. THE MCNULTY MEMO
In the wake of increased criticism to the Thompson Memo, in
December 2006, Deputy U.S. Attorney General Paul McNulty announced
the revision of the Thompson Memo.99 Although this new memorandum
supersedes and replaces the Thompson Memo, the critical point will be its
implementation by DOJ.100 It is probably too early to predict whether the
McNulty Memo differs significantly from its predecessors.
The McNulty Memo largely restates the principles of prosecution
outlined in the Thompson Memo.101 However, it has also introduced a
different approach to prosecution requests for privileged materials and
interference with the payment of attorney’s fees.102 With respect to the
latter, the new policy states that “prosecutors generally should not take into
account” advancement of legal fees as a sign of non-cooperation,103 except
in “extremely rare cases.”104 Further, the McNulty Memo advises prosecutors to consider such advancement only where “the totality of the
circumstances show[s] that it was intended to impede a criminal
investigation[,]” and adds a procedural requirement—the prosecutors must
first obtain approval from the Deputy Attorney General.105

97. See Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1228 (commenting on the DOJ’s approach that
companies that do not fire employees who refuse to be interviewed are not acting in their
shareholders’ interests).
98. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d, 330, 361 (concluding that the right to be free
from government interference in preparing a defense is part of our concept of fair play and
justice); see also Mark H. Alcott, Promoting Needed Reform, Defending Core Values, 78 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 5, 6 (Oct. 2006) (commenting that the government’s attitude that a company that helps its
employees to defend themselves is deemed uncooperative, constitutes an interference with
constitutional and fundamental concepts of our legal system).
99. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, at 2.
100. SecActions.com, The McNulty Memo Replaces Thompson—But Is There Any Real
Change?, http://www.secactions.com/?p=128 (last visited May 15, 2007).
101. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 316 (2007).
102. MCNULTY MEMO, supra note 12, at Part VII.B.3.
103. Id.
104. Id. at VII.B.3, n.3.
105. Id.
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These restrictions, however, may, in practice, have a limited effect,
consequently frustrating the goals and benefits of the new policies. As the
Memo explains, this new policy “is not meant to prevent a prosecutor from
asking questions about an attorney’s representation of a corporation or its
employees”106 and that questions about “how and by whom attorney’s fees
are paid” are “appropriate.”107 Moreover, even if the Memo states that
prosecutors cannot hold the advancement of legal fees against a corporate
target except in very rare cases, it does not explicitly exclude the possibility
that prosecutors may still look favorably on a corporation’s refusal to
advance fees. Although the Memo contains the same prohibition as outlined in the Thompson Memo on counting advancement against a corporation when such is required by law or contract,108 it does not provide any
guidelines as to how prosecutors should treat a corporation that advances
fees even when such advancement is not required by any statutory or
contractual obligation. Therefore, it could be argued that the prohibition on
considering advancement against a corporation target only applies when the
advancement is obligatory.109 Considering that business organizations facing federal investigations most probably want to avoid federal prosecution,
allowing prosecutors to even raise the topic by asking questions regarding
the advancement or grant preferential treatment to corporations that “voluntarily” refuse to advance legal fees may simply be enough of an incentive
for corporations who want to curry favor with prosecutors to do so.110
Moreover the standard for allowing prosecutors to consider a
corporation’s advancement of legal fees to its officers and employees—
when advancement is done in furtherance of impeding the government’s
investigation—may be too easily met.111 It appears that prosecutors are
afforded a rather broad discretion in concluding that a corporation attempts
to obstruct a criminal investigation through advancement of legal fees to its
officers and employees 112—it is unclear what other type of conduct

106. Id. at Part VII.B.3.
107. Id. at Part VII.B. n.4.
108. Id. at Part VII.B.
109. See Richard Janis, The McNulty Memorandum: Much Ado About Nothing (Feb. 2007),
available
at
http://www.dcbar.org.for_lawyers/resources/publigations/Washington_lawyer/
February_2007/stand.cfm (arguing that the McNulty Memo’s new policy that prosecutors
generally should not hold the advancement of legal fees against a corporation is troublesome
because in most cases corporations are permitted and not obligated to advance attorney’s fees to
employees or agents under investigation).
110. SecActions.com, supra note 102.
111. Id.
112. Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Remarks at the
Lawyers for Civil Justice Membership Conference Regarding the Department’s Charging
Guidelines in Corporate Fraud Prosecutions (Dec. 12, 2006) available at
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prosecutors are to consider under the totality of circumstances test. Thus,
there is a risk that the government may conclude that the advancement of
legal fees was improper just because the corporation has engaged in other
types of conduct aimed at obstruction generally. Additionally, the new
policy, although binding on the prosecutor during an investigation, does not
provide any remedy per se if a prosecutor were to deviate from it,113 which
could further corrode the procedural requirements.
Nevertheless, Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty maintains that
prosecutors, although allowed to retain discretion in scrutinizing advancement of legal fees under the new Memo, will continue to exercise this
discretion only in rare cases.114 According to McNulty, the “advancement
of attorneys’ fees has always been a rare consideration in [the government’s] corporate prosecutions.”115 Time will tell whether the McNulty
Memo is successful in returning the pendulum back to equilibrium in the
prosecution of corporate malfeasance. Until then, the concerns earlier
mentioned with respect to prosecutorial conduct under the Thompson
Memo and possible violations of constitutional rights remain valid. The
rights at issue rest at the core of our judicial system and their erosion in the
corporate investigations context is alarming.116 Therefore, discussion of
corporate officers’ and employees’ constitutional rights in the context of
corporate investigations becomes necessary.117

http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag_speech_061212.htm [hereinafter McNulty
Remarks] (“[F]ee advancement can be considered where the totality of the circumstances show[s]
that it was intended to impede a government investigation.”).
113. Marcia Coyle, The McNulty Memo: Real Change, or Retreat?, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 18,
2006, at 25.
114. McNulty Remarks, supra note 114.
115. Id. But see generally United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 341-44 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (criticizing the prosecutors’ scrutiny of the organization’s advancement of legal fees to its
officers and employees); Nathan Koppel, U.S. Pressures Firms Not to Pay Staff Legal Fees,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at B1 (noting three cases where prosecutors reportedly scrutinized
payments of attorney’s fees).
116. See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4-10 (expressing concern
over the prosecutorial policies because they erode the constitutional and other rights of current and
former employees).
117. Id.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS IN LIGHT OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTORIAL GUIDELINES FOR BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS
Generally, employees cannot invoke the right against self-incrimination
during a corporation’s internal investigation.118 However, because corporations often surrender the results from internal investigations to federal
investigators in hopes of cooperation credit, the suggestion that employees
should be advised of the right against self-incrimination prior to their interview is reasonable.119 Moreover, the right to counsel may be affected by a
corporation’s decision not to advance legal fees or expenses to employees
deemed “culpable” by the government.120 This would probably not amount
to any significant problems and could be considered as a corporation’s
prerogative.121 However, when the corporation’s decision to deny advancement is due to government interference, constitutional concerns arise.122
A. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT
The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”123 Thus, within the
criminal context, a defendant is afforded the right to refuse to testify against
himself or herself.124 The trier of fact is forbidden from drawing adverse
inferences from that silence.125 Further, the United States Supreme Court’s
definition of the right to silence includes not only the individual right not to
involuntary testify against himself or herself, but also the right not to
answer questions, in either civil or criminal proceedings, which may incriminate him or her in future criminal proceedings.126 Moreover, the Court
has also stated that the privilege “protects against any disclosure that the
118. John F. Savarese & Carol Miller, Protecting Privilege and Dealing Fairly with
Employees While Conducting an Internal Investigation, 1367 PLI/Corp 1027, 1068 (Apr.-June
2003).
119. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1231.
120. See generally United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 330, 367-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(finding employees’ right to counsel was violated when the employer stopped advancing legal fees
to several employees who in the DOJ’s opinion were culpable of tax fraud).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 365 (explaining that the Stein court found the corporation’s decision was due
to pressure exercised by the DOJ).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
124. Leftkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1973).
125. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (prohibiting the judge and
prosecutor from suggesting to the jury that defendant’s silence can be used as substantive
evidence of guilt).
126. Leftkowitz, 414 U.S. at 77 (citing McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)).
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witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or
could lead to other evidence that might be so used.”127 To invoke Fifth
Amendment protection, the defendant’s statements must be compelled,
testimonial, and incriminating.128
For some of the Framers, the concept of “compelled” was tangential to
torture.129 In the context of corporate governmental investigations, the
economic hardship and psychological pressure exercised upon employees
who may want to exercise their right to silence could reach the torture
analogy.130 Moreover, it is questionable whether the government should be
allowed to use employees’ statements given during internal investigations,
especially when their constitutional rights are implicated.131 However,
prosecutors have been afforded a broad discretion; for example, the
Thompson Memo has provided the ground for federal prosecutors’
expectations that corporate counsel will act as their deputies.132
It is well established that a business organization cannot assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege, and employees cannot withhold corporate documents that may incriminate them as individuals.133 Moreover, each employee owes a duty of cooperation to his or her employer, the expectation of
which is broad enough to include the duty to consent to an interview with
corporate counsel.134 Nevertheless, the question becomes whether the
employees’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is violated
when the corporation is acting under “color of law” by conducting internal

127. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972).
128. Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 904 (1995).
129. Id. at 865 n.20.
130. See Thomas O. Gorman, An Outline: DOJ and SEC Standards on Cooperation, 1581
PLI/Corp 887, 906 (Jan. 2007) (noting that because of the vagueness of the prosecutorial policies,
the threat of termination would affect anyone remotely associated with the questionable conduct).
131. Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 126 (statement of Former U.S. Att’y Gen.
Edwin Meese). Former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese opines that the government should
not be allowed to do indirectly what it is not allowed to do directly, referring to the phenomenon
of “deputizing corporate America.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
132. Id., at 135-36 (testimony of Mark B. Sheppard, Partner Sprague & Sprague).
[Corporate] counsel is expected to encourage employees to give statements without
asserting their Fifth Amendment rights and without obtaining independent counsel. . . .
[And][i]f the employee refuses, he or she faces termination with no apparent recognition of the inherent unfairness of meting out punishment for the mere invocation of a
constitutional right.
Id.
133. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104-07 (1988) (holding corporate
documents can be used against their custodians as evidence of culpability).
134. See Savarese & Miller, supra note 118, at 1068 (“[A] duty to cooperate obligates an
employee to comply with reasonable directions from the employer during an internal
investigation.”).
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investigations.135 This is especially alarming when the results are then
turned over to the government in exchange for leniency, especially since the
Fifth Amendment applies to the actions of a private entity that are found to
be “‘fairly attributable’” to the government.136 Given the strong emphasis
placed on “corporate cooperation,” it appears evident that, at least in some
cases, a company has in effect no choice but to succumb to what it perceives to be government coercion.137 Corporations are induced into trading
their officers and employees for the federal prosecutors’ leniency in their
charging decisions.138 This presents significant implications for corporate
employees as far as their constitutional rights are concerned.139
Interestingly, the DOJ does not appear to be hesitant or concerned
about such results.140 Instead, the “government now expects companies, in
essence, to deputize law firms and accounting firms to do the Government’s
work for them,” and to demand a waiver of the employee’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as a condition of continued employment.141 Such an approach is contrary to the fact that the United States
Supreme Court has found that the government itself cannot make such a
demand on its own employees.142 However, in the context of corporate
investigations, the government still equates employees’ statements to
corporate counsel during internal investigations to statements made to the
government itself.143 Therefore, it seems logical that there should be no
legitimate basis for penalizing an employee, either through termination or

135. See Bookin et al., supra note 93, at 273-76 (considering the ramifications of internal
investigations on the employees’ Fifth Amendment rights).
136. Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 71, at 3 (quoting D.L. Cromwell Inv., Inc. v. NASD
Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2002)). The Cromwell court held that a sufficiently
close nexus between the actions of the private entity and the government exists “where the state
has exercised coercive power [over a private decision] or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State.” D.L. Cromwell Inv., Inc., 279 F.3d at 161.
137. See Mary Joe White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, 1517
PLI/Corp 815, 820 (Nov. 2005) (noting that some prosecutors, often at the beginning of an
investigation, automatically “grade” a corporation’s cooperation with the investigators).
138. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1225.
139. Id.
140. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1170-71 (observing that federal investigators will
continue to pressure companies).
141. Janis, supra note 77.
142. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967) (holding that use of the threat of
discharge to secure incriminatory evidence against an employee is not allowed) (citing Slochower
v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 350 U.S. 551, 641 (1956)). The Slochower court held a public
school teacher could not be discharged for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights when questioned
by a Congressional committee. See Slochower, 350 U.S. at 557-58 (“The privilege against selfincrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent
either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury.”).
143. Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 71, at 2.
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refusal of advancement of legal fees, due to an assertion of his or her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.144
B. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a vital safeguard in criminal
proceedings.145 Given the complicated nature of federal corporate investigations, employees have an extreme interest in assuring an effective
defense.146 Determining whether an employee benefits from an effective
defense is measured by considering general principles, coupled with the
right to counsel.147 This analysis is connected to the concern that
corporations’ denial of advancement of legal fees at the “whim” of the
government, in effect, violates the right to counsel.148
1.

General Principles Coupled with the Right to Counsel

The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his
defence.”149 While the right to counsel clause has been found to include a
right to competent counsel,150 it does not entitle a criminal defendant to
have “an unqualified right to the appointment of counsel of his own
choosing.”151 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that
one element of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right of a
defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will
represent him.152 This right, however, is secured provided that the defendant has the means to hire counsel at his or her own choosing, or the chosen

144. Id.
145. See Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1231 (arguing that it is only when employees
are fairly advised by counsel representing their interests, that they can make an informed choice as
to their participation in the investigations).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that
to prepare and try a case involving corporate misconduct requires substantial resources).
147. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“[T]he right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel.”).
148. See, e.g., Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (holding that the government’s interference with
the defendants’ advancement of legal fees violated their constitutional right to counsel).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A
Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1637-57 (2003) (presenting
the evolution of the right to counsel).
150. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (1984) (recognizing that “the right to counsel is the right
to the effective assistance of counsel”); see also Stephen G. Gilles, Effective Assistance of
Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1380, 1380
(1983) (arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
includes the right to a counsel capable of mounting a competent defense).
151. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 10 (1983).
152. Unites States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2561 (2006).
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counsel is willing to represent the defendant even though he or she cannot
afford to pay.153 In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,154 the
United States Supreme Court considered a defendant’s ability to choose
counsel imposed by economic constraints and the extent to which the right
to counsel includes the right to use a third party’s assets.155 Thus, a claim
of violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would probably be
unsuccessful if the main argument were based on lack of funds without a
showing of a right to those funds.156 Further, a claim of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation generally requires a showing of prejudice.157
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. GonzalezLopez,158 held that the requirement of showing prejudice established in
Strickland is not necessary where the defendant has been deprived of the
privilege of choosing counsel.159 The Court found that the:
Deprivation of the right [to counsel of choice] is “complete” when
the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by
the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation
he received. To argue otherwise is to confuse the right to counsel
of choice—which is the right to a particular lawyer regardless of
comparative effectiveness—with the right to effective counsel—
which imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever
lawyer is chosen or appointed.160
As the holding indicates, this could provide some support for corporate
defendants who claim that by being denied payment of their legal
representation, they are deprived of counsel of choice.161 Such an argument
would be fairly persuasive, especially where the advancement was part of

153. Id. (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1989)).
154. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
155. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 626. The Supreme Court concluded that the right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment “does not go beyond ‘the individual’s right to spend his own money to
obtain the advice and assistance of . . . counsel.’” Id. “A defendant has no Sixth Amendment
right to spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are
the only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice.” Id.
156. Id.
157. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 687 (1984). The Supreme Court held that
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by a two-prong test requiring the
defendant to show: (1) that the attorney’s performance was deficient, falling below professional
standards of competence; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id.
158. 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
159. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that
the government had interfered with the defendant’s right to be represented by counsel of choice
without a showing of prejudice).
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the employment contract.162 However, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches only at a certain stage in a criminal procedure, which may
make it more difficult in cases where the legal fees were incurred prior to
this critical stage.163
The United States Supreme Court previously interpreted the Sixth
Amendment right to attach at the time of formal judicial proceedings.164
With respect to the government’s conduct post-indictment, the Supreme
Court has held that “to refuse to recognize the right to counsel for fear that
counsel will obstruct the course of justice is contrary to the basic assumption upon which [this Court] has operated in Sixth Amendment cases.”165
However, the question of government interference, as per the federal prosecutorial guidelines, could occur prior to an indictment, thus begging the
question of whether the right to counsel vests pre-indictment.166 For whitecollar practitioners such a right would be invaluable, especially because of
the common feeling that white-collar crime cases are either won or lost
during the pre-indictment stage.167 Nevertheless, there is no court decision
recognizing that such a right is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment.
Therefore, the DOJ’s approach in corporate investigations presents
society with a dilemma concerning the right to counsel in governmental
investigations of business organizations: protection of employees’ civil
rights or reduction of corporate fraud at any cost.168 This dilemma specifically impacts the right to counsel in the federal investigations of business

162. Id.
163. See generally Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 136 (testimony of Mr. Mark
B. Sheppard, Partner, Sprague & Sprague) (testifying about the importance of effective assistance
of counsel in the investigatory stage).
164. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not attach until after initiation of adversary judicial proceedings); United
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 185-90 (1984) (holding that the right to appointment of counsel
attaches only at or after institutions of adversary judicial proceeding); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion) (finding that a defendant’s right to counsel attaches only at or
after time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him “whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment”); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964) (holding a defendant has the right to counsel from the time of
arraignment).
165. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1967).
166. Stephanie A. Martz, Report From the Front Lines: The Thompson Memorandum and
the KPMG Tax Shelter Case, WALL ST. LAW., Aug. 2006, at 5.
167. See Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 136 (testimony of Mark B. Sheppard,
Partner, Sprague & Sprague) (arguing that effective assistance of counsel in the investigatory state
is critical).
168. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at n.19 (observing that after the issuance of the
Thompson Memo, the number of corporate criminal prosecutions decreased); see generally United
States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding certain aspects of the
Thompson Memo unconstitutional).
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organizations.169 When assessing the extent of a company’s cooperation,
the federal prosecutorial guidelines have permitted prosecutors to consider
whether the company is protecting employees under investigation through
the advancement of legal fees.170 In United States v. Stein, the defendants
claimed that their employer-company’s decision not to advance such fees
was induced by governmental pressure and therefore amounted to a violation of the right to counsel.171 The defendants’ main argument was that
they were deprived of lawful resources, which they needed in order to
mount an effective defense given the complicated nature of the case.172
The issue of advancement does not always have to give rise to claims
of constitutional rights violations.173 Often, the advancement of legal fees
or indemnification is regulated internally within the corporation.174 Both
the Thompson Memo and McNulty Memo recognize that prosecutors
should not hold the advancement against the corporation when such is done
pursuant to state law or contractual obligation.175
2.

Advancement of Legal Fees in Theory and Practice

Advancing legal fees differs from indemnification, which means the
reimbursement by the company to its functionaries of liabilities incurred in
the course of service to the company.176 Advancement means the company
pays expenses incurred by an employee in advance of the final disposition
of a legal matter upon the employee’s agreement to repay such amount.177
Moreover, absent a charter, bylaw, or contractual provision to the contrary,
the advancement of expenses prior to the final disposition of the legal action is permissive, not mandatory.178
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen,179 held
that advancing legal fees is an integral part of good corporate

169. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. at 367 (finding that government violated the employees’ right to
counsel issuing memorandum providing that advancement of legal fees would be considered a
negative factor in its investigation of the employer).
170. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at Part VI.B.
171. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
172. Id. at 367.
173. See Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 212 (Del. 2005) (considering the
Delaware indemnification statute allowing corporations to specify by bylaw or contract the terms
and conditions upon which advancement of legal fees may occur).
174. Id.
175. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at n.4; McNulty Memo, supra note 12, at Part
VII.B.3.
176. Savarese & Miller, supra note 118, at 1075.
177. Id. at 1077.
178. Id.
179. 888 A.2d 204 (Del. 2005).
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governance.180 By providing corporate officers and directors with funds for
the costs incurred in investigations and litigation related to their conduct on
behalf of the company, a company is acting in accordance with the principles of good corporate governance.181 Moreover, the practice of advancement of legal fees is considered an incentive for attracting competent
individuals into corporate service.182 A company’s advancement of legal
fees may not be construed as a blank check offered unconditionally to
“culpable” employees.183 Nevertheless, the DOJ does not appear to recognize the fact that a company normally would require the employee for
whom it advances legal fees, to repay such advancements in the event the
employee is not entitled to such.184
In a footnote, the Thompson Memo’s commandment, with respect to
the advancement of legal fees, did state that in some instances a company
may be required to advance such fees either under its bylaws or state law.185
A similar provision is included in the McNulty Memo.186 Also, the Holder
Memo contained a similar provision.187 Nevertheless, Holder’s approach to
the advancement issue had been a target of criticism as undermining a legal,
ethical, and useful practice.188
A decision to advance fees often must be made before there is a
sufficient factual basis to allow a company to assess the “culpability” of an
employee.189 Therefore, critics argued that the Holder approach could lead
companies to take a defensive approach and prejudge an employee’s criminal intent and conduct, thereby limiting the company’s exercise of discretion to advance fees.190 Moreover, prosecutors often abused the Holder approach by interfering with corporate employees’ ability to retain competent

180. Homestore, Inc., 888 A.2d at 211.
181. See id. (finding that high-quality corporate services are ensured by protecting corporate
officers’ and employees’ personal financial resources from exhaustion by legal expenses incurred
during an investigation or litigation resulting from the rendering of such services).
182. Id.; Dale A. Osterle, Limits on a Corporation’s Protection of Its Directors and Officers
from Personal Liability, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 513, 514-16.
183. David H. Kristenbroker et al., Criminal and Civil Investigations: United States v. Stein
and Related Issues, 1557 PLI/Corp 483, 493 (Sept. 2006).
184. See id. (pointing out that the DOJ is somewhat conditioned by its “increasingly
aggressive anti-indemnification policies”).
185. Thompson Memo, supra note 34, n.4. “Some states require corporations to pay the legal fees of officers under investigation prior to a formal determination of their guilt. Obviously, a
corporation’s compliance with governing law should not be considered a failure to cooperate.” Id.
186. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, at Part VII.B.3.
187. Holder Memo, supra note 22, at VII.B.3, n.3.
188. American College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 335-36 (2003).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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counsel absent financial support from their employer, thus gaining a
strategic advantage in the investigations.191
Prosecutors are obligated not to interfere with an individual’s legal
representation, particularly in a criminal matter.192 The United States
Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,193 held:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartiality is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.194
In light of this, white-collar criminal defense lawyers were unhappy
with the Holder Memo’s approach to the advancing of legal fees.195 They
argued that the Holder Memo’s approach created a framework that allowed
a prosecutor to interfere with an employee’s ability to obtain a wellqualified lawyer, which thereby undermines the interests of justice.196
These concerns persist because the newer federal prosecutorial guidelines
have not changed the methodology advanced by their predecessor.197 The
concerns were further discussed in the Stein case, which has since given rise
to debates also in the United States Senate.198
C. UNITED STATES V. STEIN (I)
In United States v. Stein, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York showed a strong dissatisfaction with the
Thompson Memo’s approach to the advancement of legal fees.199 “Stein
represents the first time the constitutionality of the Thompson Memo or its

191. Id.
192. Id. at 338 n.128 (explaining that under the McDade Amendment from 1998, a federal
prosecutor must adhere to state ethics rules (citing 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a))).
193. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
194. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
195. American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 188, at 338.
196. Id.
197. See generally Janis, supra note 77 (arguing that no positive effects flow from the
Thompson Memo); see also Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the
Corporate Response, 1671 PLI/Corp 331, 368 (Aug. 2007) (identifying the “carrot and stick”
approach practiced under the Holder and Thompson Memos, which rewards cooperation and
punishes non-compliance).
198. See, e.g., Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 124 (statement of Former Att’y
Gen., Edwin Meese, III) (discussing the Stein decision).
199. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The court
dismissed almost all of the government’s legal arguments. Id.
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predecessor has been litigated in federal court.”200 In essence, the issue
before the court was whether a company that refuses to advance legal fees
to employees under investigation for corporate fraud, in an effort to receive
cooperation credit, amounts to a denial of employees’ constitutional
rights.201 The court answered this question affirmatively, finding that the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments protect a defendant’s right to obtain and use
resources lawfully available to the defendant, free of knowing and reckless
government interference.202
1.

Facts

In 2002, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) referred a criminal
investigation of Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) to the DOJ.203
Prior to the referral, the IRS had conducted investigations of tax shelters
created by KPMG.204 The DOJ referred the case to the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York to determine
whether to indict KPMG and the alleged co-conspirators.205 KPMG’s
lawyers went to great lengths to portray to federal prosecutors that it fully
cooperated with the investigation, in order to convince the government not
to indict the firm.206 In the negotiating process, prosecutors asked the
KPMG lawyers whether KPMG intended to pay the attorney’s fees of
current and former employees under investigation.207
The court in Stein stated that prosecutors “deliberately, and consistent
with DOJ policy, reinforced the threat inherent in the Thompson
Memorandum” regarding payment of attorney’s fees.208 KPMG reacted by
setting a limit to the amount of attorney’s fees that it would provide for
employees in advance and by establishing policy that payment of fees
would stop if the government indicted the employee.209 A short time after
KPMG signed a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (hereinafter Agreement)

200. Lawrence J. Zweichfach & Zachary S. Taylor, United States v. Stein and the
Advancement of Attorney’s Fees: The Thompson Memorandum Under a Microscope, 1557
PLI/Corp 903, 907 (Sept. 2006).
201. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (stating that the issue before the court “arises at an
intersection of three principles of American law”).
202. Id. at 372.
203. Id. at 338.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 339.
206. Id. at 341-42.
207. Id. at 342.
208. Id. at. 352.
209. Id.
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with the government, the targeted employees were indicted, and as agreed,
KPMG stopped paying their legal fees.210
In January 2006, the indicted KPMG employees asked the court to
dismiss their indictments.211 They claimed their constitutional rights had
been violated as a result of the prosecutors’ improper interference with
KPMG’s practice of advancing attorney’s fees.212 The court ordered a
hearing on the issue of whether the evidence showed that the government
interfered with and affected KPMG’s decisions with respect to advancing
legal fees.213
2.

Summary of the Defendants’ Legal Arguments

Stein and the other defendants asserted that federal prosecutors used
the Thompson Memo in their negotiations with KPMG to frighten the firm
into ending its longstanding policy of paying its partners’ and employees’
legal fees in proceedings arising from conduct within the scope of their
employment.214 The defendants strongly criticized the Thompson Memo in
their briefs.215 Defendant Stein argued that the prosecutors lacked any clear
standard for their determination of who is a “culpable” employee not
entitled to fee advancement.216 Instead, the prosecutors are free to use their
own criteria as to what constitutes a “culpable” employee.217 In sum, the
defendants alleged violation of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.218
Their arguments built upon the perceived shortfalls of the Thompson Memo
and the prosecutors’ conduct governed by it.219
a.

The Fifth Amendment Violation

The main argument concerning the alleged violation of the right to a
fair trial revolved around the Thompson Memo and the particular conduct
of the prosecutors in the case.220 The defendants’ claims of Fifth
210. Id. at 349-50.
211. Id. at 350.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 352.
214. Brief of Petitioners-Defendants at 4, United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 Cr. 888
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioners-Defendants].
215. See, e.g., id. at 14 (arguing that the prosecution violated their constitutional rights when
it acted in accordance with the Thompson Memo).
216. Brief of Petitioner-Defendant at 22-23, United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 Cr. 888
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2006) [hereinafter Defendant Stein’s Brief].
217. Id.
218. Brief of Petitioners-Defendants, supra note 214, at 14-19.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Defendant Stein’s Brief, supra note 216, at 6 (arguing that the government
violated both substantive and procedural due process).
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Amendment infringement were premised on the belief that they had a
constitutionally protected property interest in the advancement of fees.221
Thus, the defendants argued that the government’s conduct amounted to a
“gross abuse of governmental authority” violating their substantive due
process rights. 222 However, defendant Stein argued in the alternative that,
even if there was no violation of substantive due process, the government
failed to give him adequate notice required under the procedural due
process.223
b.

The Sixth Amendment Violation

Defendant Stein acknowledged that “the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel typically attaches at indictment.”224 Nevertheless, he argued that
the government imposed an impermissible burden on this right by
interfering with his ability to retain and fund attorneys at critical stages of
the investigation.225 According to Stein, the evidence demonstrated that the
government invoked the Thompson Memo after being told by KPMG that
the firm was unsure of its obligations to pay fees.226 The government
allegedly informed KPMG that it would “microscopically scrutinize any
discretionary decision to pay fees to persons who . . . were ‘culpable.’”227
Further, defendant Weisner maintained, “that the government’s interference
with defendants’ rights, although starting prior to the initiation of formal
charges, was a continuing violation since the withholding of fees continued
post-indictment.”228

221. Id. at 6-7. Defendant Stein argued that a contract implied-in-fact existed between the
individual defendants and KPMG by virtue of the firm’s longstanding policy of always advancing
fees under similar circumstances. Id. at 8. In Stein’s case there was an express contractual
obligation made by KPMG to pay his legal fees under the terms of his separation agreement. Id.
at 12.
222. Id. at 6 (quoting Harlen Ass. v. Inc. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 505 (2d Cir.
2001)).
223. Id. at 24.
224. Id. at 17.
225. Id. Stein argued that even if the defendants may not have been entitled to the assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment during the investigatory phase, the government was not
authorized to interfere with their ability to retain counsel through contractual arrangements with
KPMG. Id.
226. Defendant Stein’s Brief, supra note 216, at 21.
227. Id. (arguing that the government’s express warning to KPMG with respect to the issue
of fee advancement, was that “misconduct cannot be rewarded”).
228. Zweichfach & Taylor, supra note 200, at 910. Defendant Weisner argued “under
Escobedo v. Illiois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that the
right to counsel attached under the Fifth Amendment when the prosecutors determined that the
defendants were ‘culpable’ and, guided by the Thompson Memorandum, coerced KPMG not to
advance them legal fees.” Id.
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The defendants were clear in their arguments. The prosecutors’ conduct during the negotiations with KPMG amounted to coercing KPMG into
stopping the advancement of legal fees.229 Thus, in their view, the federal
prosecutors had abused their power and discretion.230
3.

Summary of the Government’s Legal Arguments

The government denied that its alleged conduct amounted to such outrageous conduct that it shocked the conscience, as is the required standard
for a constitutional violation.231 It argued that, except with regard to
defendant Stein, the claim of violation of procedural due process must fail
because the other defendants could not establish the deprivation of a
cognizable property interest in the advancement of fees.232 Moreover, the
Government contended that given the nature of KPMG’s partnership
agreement’s integration clause, the defendants’ claim of a separate impliedin-fact contract to advance legal fees must fail.233
The government pointed out that the right to counsel does not attach
until the initiation of formal judicial proceedings.234 Further, no court has
recognized a continuing or “anticipatory” violation based on pre-indictment
government conduct.235 Moreover, the government interpreted and applied
federal forfeiture case law as not including a defendant’s “right” to access
third-party funds for his defense.236 Instead, the government argued that a
defendant could only reach so far as his own funds will allow in obtaining
the assistance of counsel.237 In the alternative, the government argued that
even if a Sixth Amendment violation had occurred, the defendants could
not show, as required by Strickland, that they were prejudiced by the
violation, especially because they have been represented by competent
counsel throughout the proceedings.238

229. Brief of Petitioners-Defendants, supra note 214, at 4.
230. Id. at 9.
231. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 51, United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 Cr. 88 (S.D.N.Y.
May 22, 2006) [hereinafter Government’s Post-Hearing Memorandum].
232. Id. at 54.
233. Id. at 57.
234. Id. at 75.
235. Id. at 36.
236. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 622 (1989); United States
v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 601 (1989).
237. Government’s Post-Hearing Memorandum, supra note 231, at 34.
238. Id. at 47.
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Summary of the Arguments of the Amici Curiae

An impressive list of amici curiae filed several briefs in support of the
defendants.239 The New York Council of Defense Lawyers and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers supported the
defendants’ claim that the federal prosecutors’ conduct violated both the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.240 The main argument was that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached when the government coerced KPMG
to withhold legal fees from individuals that the government deemed
“culpable.”241 Accordingly, the amici argued that the prosecutors, through
the Thompson Memo, unduly interfered with this interest, thus depriving
the defendants of counsel of choice.242 Due to the complex nature of the
case, the amici contended that the government should have an equal
concern for justice, which could only be ensured by subjecting the
government’s case to the probing of a skilled counsel for the defense.243
Further, the Securities Industry Association, the Association of
Corporate Counsel, the Bond Market Association, and the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America filed an amici curiae brief in
support of the defendants.244 The amici disapproved of the government’s
approach toward advancement of legal fees as evidenced by the Thompson
Memo.245 Additionally, they argued that without the advancement of fees,
the prospect of indemnification does little to assist defendants to secure
effective representation.246
5.

The Court’s Decision

The Federal District Court made numerous findings. First, the court
concluded that KPMG departed from its settled practice of advancing legal
fees and expenses incurred in investigations and cases to its officers and
employees due to the government’s approach spelled out in the Thompson

239. The list included: New York Council of Defense Lawyers (NYCDL); National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL); Securities Industry Association; Association
of Corporate Counsel (ACC); Bond Market Association; Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America.
240. Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants, United States v. Stein, 435 F.
Supp. 2d 330 (2006) (No. S1 05 Crim. 888) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
241. Id. at 10.
242. Id. at Part I.
243. Id.
244. Brief for the Securities Industry Association, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants, United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. S1 05 Cr. 888).
245. See generally id. at 12 (discussing the advantages of fee advancement).
246. Id.
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Memo.247 Second, the court found that the United States Attorney’s Office
reinforced the inherent threat in the Thompson Memo with respect to
KPMG’s inquiry as to whether payment of legal fees would be held against
it.248 Third, the court concluded that the government’s conduct during the
negotiations with KPMG was apparent evidence of the government’s desire
to minimize the involvement of defense attorneys.249 The government overreached in interpreting that the Thompson Memo permitted prosecutors to
instruct KPMG as to how to advise its employees about their needs for legal
representation, and encouraged KPMG to depart from well-established past
practice in paying fees.250 Fourth, the court found that the government
applied direct pressure on KPMG and that the firm, as a consequence,
decided to cut off all payments of legal fees and expenses to anyone who
was indicted and to limit and condition such payments prior to indictment
upon cooperation with the government.251 Thus, the court found that the
government violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by causing KPMG to
cut off payments of legal fees and other defense costs upon indictment of
the individual defendants.252
After noting the significant importance of a defendant’s right to
fairness in the criminal process, the court thoroughly reviewed the Due
Process Clause requirements.253 The Federal District Court also maintained
that because the consequences of a failed defense would negatively affect a
defendant, there is a heightened need for ensuring fairness in criminal
proceedings.254 The court was clearly concerned with the government’s
conduct in the case at hand.255
Regarding the alleged Fifth Amendment violation, the court agreed
with the defendants’ position that the particular intricate nature of the case
required “substantial resources.”256 The court also agreed that the

247. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 353.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 356.
253. Id. at 356-59.
254. Id. at 358.
255. Id. The Stein court was direct yet subtle in its criticism of the government’s conduct
evidenced by its choice of words. Id. For example, it stated that in criminal proceedings “the
defendant [must] be firmly in the driver’s seat, and that the prosecution not be a backseat driver.”
Id.
256. Id. at 362 n.163. Judge Kaplan calculated roughly that a six-month trial of 117 days
where a defendant was represented by a single lawyer, who devoted eight hours for each trial day
at a cost of $400 per hour, simply to attend the trial would cost $375,000. Id. However, given the
five to six million pages of documents produced by the government, and the required time to
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government interfered with the defendants’ ability to obtain resources they
would otherwise have had.257 First, the court found that the provision in the
Thompson Memo directing prosecutors to consider the advancement of
legal fees to employees as indicative of corporate non-cooperation imposes
an economic punishment before anyone has been found guilty of
anything.258 According to the court, this was not a legitimate government
interest but “an abuse of power.”259 Second, the court found the language
of the provision to be too broad because the advancement of fees can be
interpreted as “weigh[ing] against an organization independent of whether
there is any ‘circling of the wagons.’”260 Finally, the court rejected the
government’s argument that payment of legal fees is “relevant to gauging
the extent of a company’s cooperation.”261 In accordance with the policy
argument presented by the amici curiae, the court found that cooperation
and advancement of fees are not necessarily inconsistent with each other.262
In conclusion, the court found that this particular provision of the
Thompson Memo excessively burdens the constitutional rights of the
individual defendants, whose ability to defend themselves is impaired, and
therefore violates the Due Process Clause.263
The court further rejected the government’s claim that the individual
defendants did not have any Sixth Amendment rights in this case.264 It
found that the approach to advancement of fees, as contemplated by the
Thompson Memo, undermined the proper functioning of the adversary
process because it devalued “partisan advocacy on both sides of a case.”265
Further, the court held that the chain of events set in motion prior to
indictment had an actionable post-indictment effect.266 Ultimately, the
court found that the government had interfered with the defendants’ rights

prepare an appropriate defense, he thought it would be more reasonable to assume that even a
minimal defense of this case could cost $500,000 to $1 million, if not significantly more. Id.
257. Id. at 362.
258. Id. at 363.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 364.
262. Id. “[A] company may pay at the same time that it does its best to bare its corporate
soul, stands at the government’s beck and call to provide information and witnesses, and does a
myriad of other things to aid the government and clean the corporate house.” Id.
263. Id. at 364-65.
264. Id. at 366-67.
265. Id. at 368.
266. Id. at 366. “The fact that events were set in motion prior to indictment with the object of
having, or with knowledge that they were likely to have, an unconstitutional effect upon indictment cannot save the government.” Id.
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to be represented as they choose, subject only to the constraints imposed by
the resources lawfully available to them.267
6.

Implications of the Stein Decision

The Federal Court’s June 2006 decision fanned the flame of criticism
of the Thompson Memo.268 However, the decision is not binding on other
courts, and applies only where a company has legal discretion to advance
attorney’s fees.269 Even if it is unclear what the Stein decision’s long-term
implications will be, for now, it should be noted that it is considered a
useful guide for business organizations and corporate counsel contemplating an internal investigation of suspected misconduct and potential
criminal prosecution.270 The decision somewhat levels the playing field
between competing considerations of employees’ constitutional rights and
companies’ self-preservation interests to cooperate with a federal criminal
investigation to avoid a corporate “death sentence.”271
Nevertheless, the DOJ’s corporate prosecutorial guidelines also present
non-constitutional concerns.272 The demise of Arthur Andersen presents a
good example of the consequences of prosecutors’ aggressive approach to
criminal investigations.273 In light of this, public policy considerations may
call for a softer approach for the benefit of society at large.274

267. Id.
268. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (arguing that in addition to the
waiver provisions, the Thompson Memo provision dealing with the advancement of legal fees
strikes at the core of our adversarial system of justice).
269. A corporation may be required to advance legal fees and expenses by its policies, bylaws or employment contracts. See, e.g., Thompson Memo, supra note 34, at VII.B. n.4. In such
cases, the government is not permitted to take the advancement into consideration in its charging
decision. See id. (listing the situations when prosecutors should not take advancement into
account).
270. Rebecca Walker, The Thompson Memo: Implications of the Stein Decision for
Corporate Compliance, 1561 PLI/Corp 253, 255 (Sept. 2006).
271. Id. at 261.
272. See John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
579, 632-33 (2005) (enumerating five ethical dilemmas for businesses).
273. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing possible consequences to the federal government’s
aggressive pursuit of corporate misconduct).
274. See generally, Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81
IND. L.J. 473, 537 (2006) (arguing for a narrower standard of corporate criminal liability).
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS
REGARDING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CORPORATE
INVESTIGATIONS
Federal prosecutors’ aggressive pursuit of corporate investigations
presents several public policy concerns.275 Such an aggressive approach
may have negative effects on corporations’ competitiveness and financial
markets at large.276 Perhaps more significant is the perceived erosion of our
adversarial system with respect to corporate investigations, which may validate a slippery slope argument.277 The following discussion will address
these main public policy concerns.278
A. AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF CORPORATE MISCONDUCT RISKS A
MYRIAD OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Prosecutorial witch-hunts put the stability of the financial markets at
risk.279 In complex white-collar crime investigations, federal prosecutors
have been vested with wide prosecutorial discretion.280 They decide not
only the nature and the number of charges they choose to bring, but also if
such charges should be brought against the business organization and/or
culpable individuals.281
It has been argued to the contrary that corporate prosecutions resulting
from such prosecutorial powers have lead to stabilization in the financial
markets and restoration of investors’ confidence as well as “accountability
in corporate boardrooms.”282 However, prosecutors’ broad discretion to indict a company may come at a high price, especially for innocent employees, as evidenced by the demise of Arthur Andersen.283 Moreover, it is
275. See, e.g., Hasnas, supra note 272, at 632-33 (discussing the ethical problems
encountered by business people in the wake of a federal investigation threat).
276. See Gorman, supra note 130, at 904 (discussing the general impact of federal prosecutorial actions with regard to corporations).
277. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Powers in an Adversarial System: Lessons
from Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 191
(2004) (endorsing the view that federal prosecutions of white collar crimes move the adversarial
system closer to the inquisitorial system).
278. See generally id. at 208-10 (identifying the risks of prosecutorial discretion in whitecollar crime cases).
279. Gorman, supra note 130, at 904.
280. Lance Cole, Corporate Criminal Liability in the 21st Century: A New Era?, 45 S. TEX.
L. REV. 147, 154 (2003).
281. Id.
282. See Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 110-11 (statement of Deputy Att’y
Gen., DOJ, Paul J. McNulty) (explaining briefly the corporate scandals preceding the Thompson
Memo and noting that the Thompson Memo promotes transparency in the charging process).
283. See Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1229 (discussing the implications of the
indictment of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen). The authors note that not even the reversal
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questionable whether the charging process is as transparent as professed
and whether the federal prosecutorial guidelines are employed only for the
purpose of the charging decision.284 These concerns are heightened when a
former U.S. Attorney urges that “prosecutors should change or at least
moderate how they are treating companies in criminal investigations.”285
Some prosecutors, in their zealous endeavor to combat corporate misconduct, skip a fundamental step in their discretionary corporate charging
decision—whether the particular case is even appropriate for charging.286
Such an automatic invocation of the DOJ’s prosecutorial guidelines in
every corporate investigation could compromise and significantly endanger
critical business organizations, as well as the interests of innocent shareholders, employees, and customers.287 This is especially true considering
how a company threatened with the possibility of an indictment is perceived
in the financial markets.288
Moreover, the core message of the DOJ’s prosecutorial principles, that
companies be “good corporate citizens,” raises certain concerns.289 First,
“[a]ll prosecutors recognize—or should—that no matter how good a
company’s corporate culture and compliance programs are, there will always be crimes committed by employees.”290 Therefore, the logical question becomes: how far does a company have to travel in its efforts to please
the government so as to be considered a “good corporate citizen”?291

of the Arthur Andersen’s conviction by a unanimous United States Supreme Court could have
resurrected the firm and by the time it had been convicted the firm had ceased to exist. Id. See
also White, supra note 137, at 817 (noting that little, if anything, would comfort the several
thousands of Arthur Andersen’s honest employees who lost their jobs and professional
reputations).
284. See White, supra note 137, at 818-19 (expressing growing concern over how the
Thompson Memo is being employed by some prosecutors in order to force companies into
compliance and reform).
285. Id. at 819 (explaining that a change in prosecutors’ attitudes toward companies in
criminal investigations is necessary).
286. Id. at 820.
287. Id. at 825; see also Gorman, supra note 130, at 904 (stating that there is a tremendous
amount of pressure on corporations facing federal investigations). If the filing of criminal charges
does not lead to a corporation’s demise, the corporation would at least be severely affected
economically. Id. at 904-05.
288. See Gibeaut, supra note 77, at 50 (noting money-laundering allegations can affect
publicly traded companies’ stock price); see also Arik Hessedahl, Dell Disappoints Once More
(Aug. 18, 2006), available at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2006/
tc20060818_571306.htm (stating the news of federal investigations led to a drop in the stock
price).
289. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 10, at 311 (questioning the federal prosecutors’ authority to
reform companies into good corporate citizens).
290. White, supra note 137, at 819.
291. See Gibeaut, supra note 77, at 49 (noting that Enron had a compliance plan that was
regarded as state-of-the-art).
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Establishing compliance programs and always being on alert for possible
misconduct may require prohibitive additional costs that common sense
dictates will inevitably spill over on consumers.292 Second, prosecutors’
aggressive approach toward corporate cooperation puts companies in a
tough spot when deciding to cooperate or not.293 Choosing to cooperate
may expose a company to substantial civil liability, while declining to
cooperate increases the risk of a criminal indictment and the possibility of
the company’s stock collapsing or of a corporate fatality similar to Arthur
Andersen.294 Third, the lack of a bright-line definition of “cooperation” is
problematic—the McNulty Memo, similar to the Thompson Memo,
emphasizes cooperation between “responsible corporate leaders” and the
DOJ.295 However, the DOJ has not yet provided a bright-line definition of
cooperation that could end the current fear of indictment if an organization
does not fully cooperate and protects individuals.296 For example, although
the McNulty Memo generally prohibits prosecutors from counting
advancement of legal fees against a corporation, prosecutors are still
allowed to consider the corporation’s joint defense agreement in return for
cooperation credits.297 Consequently, targeted business organizations would
most probably be induced to also deny the advancement in light of an
imminent criminal indictment, especially since the new prosecutorial principles do not include a blanket prohibition for considering advancement of
legal fees.298 Fourth, in today’s highly competitive corporate world, companies must often provide incentives and safeguards to attract the most
competent managers and employees.299 The Model Business Corporation
Act 300 considers the advancement of legal fees as employee contract

292. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy
Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 107 (2004) (observing that over the last decade corporate
expenditures on compliance have increased).
293. Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and “Good Corporate
Citizenship,” 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 979, 981 (2002).
294. See id. at 999 (providing ample examples of possible consequences for companies that
choose to resist the threat of indictment).
295. McNulty Memo, supra note 12, at 3.
296. See Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1145 (noting that an emphasis on full cooperation
allows the government to “stack the deck against individual defendants”).
297. Alexandra A.E. Shapiro & Robert J. Malionek, Value of Cooperation: McNulty Memo
Impact on DOJ, 236 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 2006, at 1.
298. See supra Part II.C. (explaining the current prosecutorial instructions with respect to the
advancement of legal fees).
299. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005).
300. A.B.A. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (3d ed., 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/library/onlinepublications/mbca2002.pdf.
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incentives to be “sound public policy.”301 Once a company demonstrates a
willingness to either terminate employees or refuse to advance attorney’s
fees, that company may have difficulty recruiting and retaining new staff,
which eventually could be as damaging as an indictment.302 This possibility would also “devastate corporate morale particularly if employees are
terminated or prosecuted on privileged statements made to the corporation.”303 To maintain leadership in today’s global economy, American
companies need to find the most talented personnel and provide them with a
working environment that fosters trust and support in the company and in
each other.304 The DOJ’s approach tempts companies with an incentive for
contrary practices.305 These stated public policy reasons support the
contention that the DOJ should adopt a potentially less destructive approach
in its combat of corporate misconduct.306
B. AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF CORPORATE MISCONDUCT UNDERMINES
THE CORE OF OUR ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
Former United States Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter explained:
Our[] [system] is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial
system. . . . Such has been the characteristic of Anglo-American
criminal justice since it freed itself from practices borrowed by the
Star Chamber from the Continent. . . . Under our system, society
carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out
of his own mouth.307
Perhaps the most vital public policy concern with respect to the prosecutorial discretion under the DOJ’s approach is that it differs significantly
from the adversarial ideal because the process is operating without any
checks on prosecutorial powers.308 In our adversarial justice system, the

301. Stephen A. Radin, Sinners Who Find Religion: Advancement of Litigation Expenses to
Corporate Officials Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 REV. LITIG. 251, 262 (2006) (citing 2 MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.53 off. cmt. at 8-337 (3d ed. Supp. 2005)).
302. See generally Gorman, supra note 130, at 905-06 (arguing that a corporation may be
severely impeded from doing business as a consequence).
303. Simons, supra note 293, at 998.
304. See, e.g., Homestore, Inc., 888 A.2d at 211 (considering indemnification as an
inducement for attracting capable individuals into the business world).
305. Gorman, supra note 130, at 913. Because of the detrimental consequences criminal
charges may bring, corporations would cooperate with the government rather than face the fate of
Arthur Andersen. Id.
306. E.g., Hasnas, supra note 272, at 632-33.
307. George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
985, 991 (2005) (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949)).
308. See Moohr, supra note 277, at 219 (concluding that the investigatory decisions of
United States Attorneys are not generally supervised by the DOJ).
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parties in a dispute are treated as equals and allowed to put forth their case
in front of a trier of fact to decide the truthfulness of an accusation.309 This
is significantly different from the inquisitorial system in which the investigation is initiated and conducted by the state.310 A former federal prosecutor maintains that “[o]ur current system of justice, at least insofar as it
applies to investigations of corporations and other organizations and their
employees, has . . . reached . . . a point [beyond which even justice becomes
unjust].”311 This observation appears accurate especially considering the
summary effect of the government’s aggressive approach in rooting out
corporate misconduct—companies are “expected to do the work, suffer any
consequences and enable the Government to take credit for striking at
white-collar crime.”312 The question becomes apparent: If the government
can evade the adversarial system with respect to companies, what will stop
it from eroding the adversarial system also with respect to citizens?313
The DOJ’s trend of pressuring companies to either terminate or deny
the advancement of legal fees to employees who are deemed “culpable” by
the government, without any sort of adversarial procedure, illustrates this
erosion at work.314 As a matter of public policy, and in accordance with the
highly valued core characteristics of our criminal judicial system, the
decision regarding culpability should be made in a court of law in the
absence of voluntary self-incrimination.315 This concern also underlies the
American Bar Association’s (ABA) opposition to the policies provided in
the Thompson Memo.316 Especially with regard to the advancing of legal
fees, the ABA’s concern is evident.317 Interestingly, the ABA notes that the

309. Id. at 192-23.
310. Id.; see also Ellard, supra note 307, at 991-92 (“The Thompson Memorandum . . . [has]
move[d] the investigative, charging, and plea process toward an inquisitorial system by shifting
power from courts and juries to the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorneys who work for
it.”).
311. Janis, supra note 77, at preface.
312. Gibeaut, supra note 77, at 47-48.
313. See Moohr, supra note 277, at 219-20 (expressing concern over the DOJ’s inquisitorial
approach).
314. See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-10 (discussing the policy
of government and the practice of indemnification or advancement of attorney’s fees).
315. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The Stein court
stated, referring to the government coercion on companies to deprive employees the means of
defending themselves against criminal charges in a court of law, “the determination of guilt or
innocence must be made fairly—not in a proceeding in which the government has obtained an
unfair advantage long before the trial has even begun.” Id.
316. See generally ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-10 (noting the enormous
impact of the language in the Thompson Memo).
317. See generally id. The ABA Task Force concludes that the Thompson Memo’s approach
to the advancing of legal fees “strikes at the core of our adversarial system of justice.” Id. at 10.
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DOJ’s approach to the advancement issue runs counter to the DOJ’s own
internal policies and regulations permitting the Department to pay for a
prosecutor’s outside counsel in the event of a federal criminal
investigation.318
Judges and defense lawyers have now waived the cautionary flags with
respect to prosecutorial practices.319 This skepticism signals that important
foundational public policy concerns are at risk due to the aggressive
strategies being employed by federal prosecutors.320 This interference
undermines the core of our adversarial system of justice, and risks wider
negative social and economic outcomes.321 Therefore, there is an urgent
call for more prominent and concrete amendments to the government’s
approach to corporate investigations.322 Former attorneys and white-collar
crime defense lawyers have suggested several different modifications, yet
the revision of the Thompson Memo has been slow and insubstantial.323
V. TAILORING A SOLUTION
It is apparent that a balance must be struck between reducing corporate
misconduct and protecting individuals’ rights and liberties.324 A balance
must be struck also between governmental prosecutorial methods and
companies’ defenses against indictment.325 The DOJ does not operate in a
vacuum; rather, it continually measures the temperature of the legal community’s responses to its prosecutorial methods.326 In the wake of Stein
The Task Force also falls short of finding any legitimate government interest in pressuring
companies to deny their employees advancement of legal fees. Id.
318. Id. at 10 n.32.
319. E.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
320. See Gorman, supra note 130, at 904-05 (pointing out the pressures and harsh
consequences organizations face because of vague standards).
321. Id.
322. E.g., Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 125 (testimony of Former Att’y Gen.,
Edwin Meese, III) (recognizing the importance of ensuring that “members and suspected members
of whatever criminal class . . . still receive the full benefit of the constitutional rights and fairness
considerations that belong to every American”).
323. See, e.g., id. at 130 (providing several recommendations); see also Janis, supra note 77
(finding “striking” that the “Thompson Memorandum has been adopted virtually verbatim in the
McNulty Memorandum,” and stating the McNulty Memo, in fact, institutionalizes the “‘culture of
waivers,’” which the Thompson Memo has been criticized for having created).
324. See supra Part III (discussing the constitutional rights implications).
325. See generally John Hasnas, Department of Coercion, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2006, at A9
(“Under current federal law and [DOJ] policy, it would be irresponsible management to attempt to
defend the corporation or its employees.”).
326. See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to
Heads of Dep’t Components U.S. Att’ys on Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work
Product Protection (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org.poladv/
mccaluummemo212005.pdf (responding to the increasing criticism over the DOJ’s approach to
waivers of these privileges).
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and new unanimous criticism of the prosecutorial guidelines, perhaps the
DOJ will soon reconsider its strategy and amend its approach with respect
to the advancement of a legal fees provision.327
Complete elimination of the factors enumerated in the various federal
prosecutorial guidelines would not necessarily be desirable because of the
risk of lessened predictability and transparency.328 For example, instead of
the current totality approach, the DOJ could specify which, if any, of the
factors can or may be ignored and under what circumstances.329 Former
Attorney General Edwin Meese validly points out that “[i]t is axiomatic that
when a governmental body or agency defines rules for its own conduct that
are vague and indefinite, it thereby retains to itself near-absolute discretion
to act as it may choose in any given circumstance.”330 Although the government contended in Stein that KPMG’s decision not to advance legal fees
to employees under investigation was a business decision made without
government interference, the Government’s position is naïve.331 Few, if
any, risk-aversive corporate counsel and companies would believe they
really have a choice of action.332
The Federal District Court noted in Stein that corporate cooperation
with the government, by honoring agreements of advancement of legal fees,
is not necessarily unfeasible.333 Thus, the provision that deals with the
advancement issue could be modified so that any reference to it is
eliminated.334 This seems to be a necessary step especially because of the
effect it can have on corporate officers’ and employees’ constitutional rights
in this type of complex criminal case.335 Alternatively, the policies could

327. See Karen J. Mathis, ABA President, Statement Regarding Revisions to the Justice
Department’s Thompson Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
abanet/media/statement.cfm?releaseid=59 (stating that the revisions under the McNulty Memo
“fall short of what is needed to prevent further erosion of . . . employee protections during
government investigations”).
328. Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 113 (statement of Deputy Att’y Gen., DOJ,
Paul McNulty).
329. Id. at 127 (testimony of Former Att’y Gen. Edwin Meese, III).
330. Id.
331. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that the
United States Attorney’s Office knowingly reinforced the inherent threat of criminal charges
found in the Thompson Memo).
332. See Hasnas, supra note 272, at 633 (alluding to a corporation’s final decision to
cooperate with the government).
333. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d, at 363.
334. Thompson Memo Hearing, supra note 70, at 130-31 (testimony of Former Att’y Gen.,
Edwin Meese, III).
335. Id.
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be amended so that employees no longer have to fear for their jobs if they
assert their right against self-incrimination.336
A more proactive suggestion would be a revision of the nature of
criminal corporate liability to reflect a company’s efforts to deter criminal
conduct by its employees.337 Thus, some practitioners argue that the government should bear the burden of showing that a company’s compliance
program is not sufficient to prevent misconduct.338 However, such an
approach may not be sufficient after all.339
There may be a way for business organizations to stand by their
employees without being discounted as non-cooperative.340 For example,
the federal prosecutorial guidelines, now outlined in the McNulty Memo,
could provide some guidance as to how the Government determines who is
a “culpable” employee or agent.341 Also, because there could be situations
where the government’s assessment of an employee’s culpability does not
correspond to a company’s internal investigation, the guidelines should
explain whose assessment should prevail and why.342
Until the DOJ adopts a clearer standard, corporate counsel and companies ought to look over their charters, bylaws, or any individual agreements regarding the advancement question.343 Moreover, defense experts
recommend that any discussions with the government should be well
documented.344 Furthermore, corporate counsel should be permitted to
explain to employees who are subject to internal investigation interviews
the nature and purpose of the interview, and clarify that the attorney
represents the company and not the individual.345 Separate counsel should
be made available to employees, since only after being advised by counsel
serving their interests, they might make an informed decision as to whether

336. Id. at 147-48 (written testimony by Andrew Weissman, Partner Jenner & Block LLP).
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., id. at 149 (arguing that the government should establish that the corporation
did not employ effective policies).
339. See, e.g., Gibeaut, supra note 77, at 50 (noting that Enron had adopted a state-of-the-art
compliance program, yet misconduct was obviously not prevented).
340. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that
prior to criminal indictment there must be a way for justice to be done without threatening an
indictment and coercing companies to turn against their officers and employees).
341. See generally id. (implying that prosecutors’ determination based on their own criteria
should be inadmissible).
342. See, e.g., Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (arguing that the government’s subjective
determination of who is “culpable” also undermines the adversary system).
343. Couden, supra note 5, at 423.
344. Id.
345. Robeck et al., supra note 18, at 26.
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to talk to the counsel for the company or to assert their Fifth Amendment
rights.346
VI. CONCLUSION
The current state of law concerning an individual’s right against selfincrimination and the right to counsel in the federal corporate investigations
context is certainly ambiguous.347 Although most of the criticism of the
DOJ’s corporate investigations approach has focused on the waiver of the
attorney-client and work product privileges, fresh controversy is emerging
over advancement of legal fees.348 Hopefully, these new concerns will spur
the DOJ into adopting some of the suggestions discussed above. The best
outcome would be that the DOJ completely disregard corporations’
advancement of legal fees.349
The Stein case may only be the tip of the iceberg in judicial review of
the controversial prosecutorial policies that emerged in the wake of Enron
and other corporate citizens.350 Obviously, the goal of rooting out corporate
misconduct is noble and beneficial to the entire society. However, when
the spillover effects amount to violations of an individual’s fundamental
rights, the consequences should no longer be accepted as collateral damage.351 Only time and the frequency of future Enron-like debacles will tell
whether constitutional considerations trump entrepreneurial prosecutorial
means.
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346. Silbert & Joannou, supra note 65, at 1231.
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